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Sticky Regulations and Net Neutrality Restoring
Internet Freedom
AARON L. NIELSON†
Stable law is valuable, yet also remarkably lacking in our nation’s internet policy. Over the last
two decades, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has charted a zigzagging course
between heavier and lighter regulation. Last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit largely upheld the agency’s latest shift—this time toward deregulation. But in
2016, that same court upheld the agency’s shift in the opposite direction. And to top it all off, some
predict that after political control of the White House shifts, the FCC may again reverse course
and reinstate a policy similar to what the FCC has recently overridden. The upshot of this series
of policy reversals is that it is difficult for anyone to make long-term investment decisions
premised on any particular internet policy because that policy may not have a long shelf life. This
makes it harder for the private sector to plan and for the FCC to encourage investment.
This Essay, however, is not about internet policy. Rather, it uses this example to examine
stickiness more broadly, as well as whether and how that stickiness can or should be increased.
To the extent, for instance, that we believe that greater stability is sufficiently valuable, which is
debatable, it may make sense to revisit aspects of administrative law that make it relatively easy
for agencies to reverse course, including adding more procedural steps or requiring better
explanations to change policy. Ultimately, however, administrative law likely will not be able to
create stability for controversial, highly-salient issues. When it comes to achieving the social
benefits of stability, rulemaking is a poor substitute for legislation.

† Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. The Author thanks Gus Hurwitz
for reviewing a draft of this Essay.
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“The Commission’s authority under the Act includes classifying various services
into the appropriate statutory categories. In the years since the Act’s passage,
the Commission has exercised its classification authority with some frequency.”1
“[I]n a world in which regulated parties reasonably lack confidence in the
stability of the regulatory scheme, agencies are less able to pursue policies with
longer time horizons.”2

INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 2019, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC) decision to replace the agency’s so-called “Net Neutrality”
or “Open Internet” order,3 issued in 2015,4 with the FCC’s “Restoring Internet
Freedom” order, issued in 2018.5 The 2018 order adopts “a market-based, ‘lighttouch’ policy for governing the Internet and depart[s] from [the agency’s] 2015
order that had imposed utility-style regulation.”6 This policy reversal is a big
deal for internet policy in the United States. But this was not the FCC’s first
reversal. The FCC’s 2015 policy marked a reversal from an earlier FCC policy
that itself—arguably—also was a reversal from yet another earlier FCC policy.
In other words, the FCC has been zigzagging on fundamental policy issues
governing the internet for a long time. And not surprisingly, the “zigs” and the
“zags” correspond with changes in presidential administrations. The upshot of
this series of significant reversals is that the D.C. Circuit’s 2019 decision
strongly suggests that any reliance by private industry on the FCC’s 2015 policy
was foolhardy given the prospect of change.7
The D.C. Circuit’s skepticism of reliance on the FCC’s 2015 policy was
surely correct—at least descriptively. Judged against black-letter administrative
law, which largely allows agencies to change policy just as the FCC has
repeatedly done,8 no reasonable participant in the telecommunications industry
could have been that confident following the creation of the FCC’s 2015 policy
that a new administration wouldn’t come into power and chart a different course.
The same point is true for those making investment decisions today—it would
be risky to place too much confidence in the FCC’s 2018 policy, which also may
not be long for this world. Should the White House flip political hands in 2020

1. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
2. Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 91 (2018).
3. Well, mostly upheld. The Court sided against the agency on some points, but did not vacate the entire
order. See Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18.
4. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) (“2015 Order”). The 2015
Order is often called the “Net Neutrality” or “Open Internet” order. See, e.g., A Brief History of Net Neutrality,
WIRED, https://www.wired.com/amp-stories/net-neutrality-timeline/ (last visited June 28, 2020).
5. See Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018) (“2018 Order”).
6. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 17.
7. Id. at 64 (“[I]n light of the Commission’s approach to classifying cable modem service and Internet
access since the late 1990s, the Title II Order could reasonably have been viewed as a regulatory step that might
soon be reversed. . . . Any reliance on the rules of the Title II Order would not have been reasonable unless
tempered by substantial concerns for legal or political jeopardy.”).
8. See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 2, at 90–92.
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or 2024, the FCC, under new management, presumably will revert to something
like the 2015 policy.
Whether the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion should be correct, however, is a
different question. Is this really the sort of regulatory system we want—one in
which major policies zigzag from administration to administration? Elsewhere I
have discussed the concept of “sticky regulations”—regulations backed by a
credible agency commitment that the policy will not be changed too soon.9
Stickiness allows regulated parties to invest with greater confidence that they
will be able to recoup their investment over the long run, which enhanced
investment in turn better allows agencies to pursue long-term policies.
Few aspects of administrative law, however, provide stickiness. Agencies
receive deference for many legal questions, which—per the Brand X doctrine—
sometimes allows them to override judicial decisions that would otherwise lock
policy in place.10 And per Fox Television, agencies also do not bear an especially
heavy burden when reversing prior policy, as the APA “makes no
distinction . . . between initial agency action and subsequent agency action
undoing or revising that action.”11 And although an agency sometimes must
“provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy
created on a blank slate,” for instance “when its prior policy has engendered
serious reliance interests,”12 that principle seems to have little force when it
comes to zigzagging policies, as the very act of zigzagging by the agency makes
it harder for reasonable “reliance interests” to develop in the first place.13
Accordingly, in many cases, to the extent stickiness exists at all, it is the product
of administrative law’s procedures and in particular the very “ossification” that
those procedures are said to produce.14
The FCC’s pattern of crafting major policies for internet regulation and
then reversing those policies when presidential administrations change casts
doubt on whether “ossification” provides meaningful stickiness, at least for
high-profile, politically-salient policies, for which agencies may be able to
“speed things along if they are motivated to do so.”15 To the extent that stickiness
is valuable,16 the question thus becomes what can be done to make law more
stable.

9. See id. at 89–90.
10. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Jonathan
Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (2007)
(explaining implications of Brand X).
11. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
12. Id.
13. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
14. See Nielson, supra note 2, at 89–90. Whether the rulemaking process is, in fact, ossified is the subject
of a spirited academic debate. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1209,
1219 (2018) (discussing the debate).
15. Nielson, supra note 14, at 1218.
16. As I have explained elsewhere, stickiness is not always valuable. Sometimes an agency “just wants
some activity to stop.” Id. at 1237. Likewise, the desire to create stickiness may also create perverse incentives,
especially for controversial policies.
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Using the FCC’s stabs at internet regulation as an example, this Essay
explores how to increase policy stickiness. For instance, the Supreme Court or
Congress could revisit Brand X or Fox, two cases that make it harder for
agencies to credibly commit to particular policies. Similarly, Congress is free to
require additional procedures for the regulatory process, especially for the
highest profile rules. Finally, it may be time to expand the so-called “major
questions” doctrine, which would leave the most important policies to Congress.
Because statutes are almost always stickier than regulations, perhaps certain
categories of policies are simply poor fits for the administrative process. To be
clear, my point here is not that any or all of these options are worthwhile.
Stickiness, after all, may not be worth the price. But if that is the conclusion, no
one should complain about instability and diminished investment.
I. REGULATING THE INTERNET
The FCC’s zigzagging approach to internet regulation is not a secret.17
Here, I’ll briefly summarize the story.
A. THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress enacted “two potential
classifications for broadband Internet: ‘telecommunications services’ under
Title II of the Act and ‘information services’ under Title I.”18 The distinction
matters a great deal, as a Title II designation carries with it “common carrier
status” that in turn “triggers an array of statutory restrictions and requirements,”
including a prohibition on “‘unjust or unreasonable’” conduct.19 As mushy
words like “unjust or unreasonable” suggest, the FCC has a great deal of
discretion over common carriers. “Information services,” by contrast, are not
subject to “common carriage status.”20
Which classification to use thus is a significant question—the answer to
which prompts strong opinions, often with a political and ideological tint. In
particular, those who believe that internet providers should be subject to heavier
regulation believe that the FCC should classify those providers as

17. See, e.g., John Blevins, The Use and Abuse of “Light-Touch” Internet Regulation, 99 B.U. L. REV.
177, 185 (2019) (examining at length “the historical origins and limitations of the light-touch narrative”); Justin
(Gus) Hurwitz, Net Neutrality: Something Old; Something New, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 665, 671–75 (2015);
Jay S. Kaplan, Finding the Middle Ground: A Proposed Solution to the Net Neutrality Debate, 26 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 230, 232 (2018) (explaining “four time periods” of “internet regulation”); see also Randolph J. May,
The Ongoing Saga of Chevron and Net Neutrality, REG. REV. (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/
2019/10/21/may-ongoing-saga-chevron-net-neutrality/ (examining “the long saga of back-and-forth regulatory
treatment of internet access regulation”).
18. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 17.
19. Id.; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005)
(“Telecommunications carrier . . . must charge just and reasonable, nondiscriminatory rates to their customers,
design their systems so that other carriers can interconnect with their communications networks, and contribute
to the federal ‘universal service’ fund.”) (citations omitted).
20. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 17.
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“telecommunications services,” while those who favor a light-touch regime push
for an “information services” classification.
B. THE AMBIGUOUS EARLY PERIOD
The FCC first addressed this issue in 1998, briefly, when it determined that
internet (then over telephone lines) should be classified as a
“telecommunications service.”21 The agency’s analysis, however, was far from
pellucid. The FCC “conclude[d] that advanced services,” which the agency had
defined to mean broadband, “are telecommunications services.”22 The agency
quickly went on, however, to say that no one had disagreed “that a carrier
offering such a service is offering a ‘telecommunications service,’” and noted
that “[a]n end-user may utilize a telecommunications service together with an
information service, as in the case of Internet access.”23 Around the same time,
however, the FCC prepared the so-called “Stevens Report” for Congress that
“concluded that Internet access providers do not offer ‘telecommunications
service’ when they furnish Internet access to their customers.”24
In 2000, the FCC solicited public comments about whether to classify cable
broadband as a “telecommunications service.”25
C. THE 2002 CLASSIFICATION
In 2002, after receiving comments, the FCC concluded that cable
broadband should be classified as an “information service.”26 Notably, the
agency did this, in part, “to remove regulatory uncertainty that in itself may
discourage investment and innovation.”27 The FCC reasoned that certainty—
especially, perhaps, deregulatory certainty—would encourage cable broadband
providers and related companies to invest in infrastructure.28 Over the next five
years, the agency extended that decision to broadband more generally.29
The FCC’s classification of cable broadband was challenged in the Ninth
Circuit. In 2000, the Ninth Circuit had held—in a case to which the FCC was

21. See Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24011
(1998).
22. Id. at 24029; see also Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing this history).
23. Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. at 24030.
24. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11541 (1998).
25. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 15 FCC Rcd.
19287, 19296–98 (2000).
26. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd.
4798, 4802 (2002).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 4801–02. The order further emphasized the agency’s statutory charge to “‘encourag[e] the
deployment . . . of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans’ by . . . regulating methods that
remove barriers to infrastructure investment.” Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2018)).
29. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks,
22 FCC 5901 (2007); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20
FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005).
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not a party—that a cable model service is a “telecommunications service.”30 This
decision was made prior to the FCC’s classification decision, so the court was
in a position where it had to interpret the statute as a matter of first impression,
without deference. In 2003, in a case subsequent both to its 2000 opinion finding
that cable internet service was a telecommunications service and the FCC’s 2002
contrary classification of cable broadband as an information service, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the court’s earlier decision controlled and was binding on
the FCC.31
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Brand X.32 The Court, in
an opinion by Justice Thomas, concluded that the FCC’s classification decision
was entitled to Chevron deference,33 and, in so doing, rejected an argument
about the risk of agency inconsistency. In particular, Justice Thomas explained
that “inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s
interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at
most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious
change.”34 But an explained change is generally permissible “since the whole
point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a
statute with the implementing agency,” especially because “[a]n initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”35 Hence, Brand X holds that “[a]
court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion.”36 Importantly, the Court stressed that
allowing a prior judicial decision to trump an agency’s subsequent interpretation
of an ambiguous statute “would ‘lead to the ossification of large portions of our
statutory law,’ by precluding agencies from revising unwise judicial
constructions of ambiguous statutes.”37
After establishing that agencies are not per se bound by earlier judicial
decisions, the Justices concluded that the FCC’s interpretation of
“telecommunications service” was entitled to Chevron deference because the
1996 Act was sufficiently ambiguous and the FCC’s decision was reasonable.38

30. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1130–32 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing AT&T Corp. v.
Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)).
31. Id. at 1132.
32. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 972 (2005).
33. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
34. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 981.
35. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64).
36. Id. at 982.
37. Id. at 983 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
38. See id. at 989–1000.
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D. THE 2015 RECLASSIFICATION
In 2015, the FCC—following a decade of court-rejected efforts to impose
more internet regulations39—reversed course and concluded that broadband
internet access is a telecommunications service after all.40 After public comment,
the agency concluded that reclassification was necessary “to bring a decade of
debate to a certain conclusion.”41 The FCC also explained its reversal, reasoning
that “the facts in the market today are very different from the facts that supported
the Commission’s 2002 decision to treat cable broadband as an information
service and its subsequent application to fixed and mobile broadband
services.”42 The agency stressed, however, that it would not regulate too
aggressively, “consistent with further investment and broadband deployment.”43
The agency also read Fox broadly, reasoning that the agency had no “special
burden” to account for reliance interests and that “the regulatory history
regarding the classification of broadband Internet access service would not
provide a reasonable basis for assuming that the service would receive sustained
treatment as an information service.”44
That policy reversal was unsuccessfully challenged in the D.C. Circuit in
2016.45 The court concluded that, under Brand X, the FCC’s new legal
conclusion was entitled to deference because the statute is ambiguous and the
FCC’s conclusion was reasonable.46 The panel majority also rejected an
argument that the FCC’s reclassification was arbitrary and capricious because it
upset reliance interests.47 Among other points, the majority accepted the FCC’s
characterization of the zigzagging history of regulation and concluded that the
agency’s view that there was not enough reliance to prevent reclassification was
sufficiently explained, especially given the agency’s views about changed
factual circumstances.48 Judge Williams, in dissent, disagreed.49

39. See generally Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the agency’s 2010
order unlawfully regulated internet access as common carriage); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 642–43
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting an effort to regulate “network management practices”).
40. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015); A Brief History of Net
Neutrality, supra note 4.
41. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5614.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 5760.
45. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
46. Id. at 701–06.
47. Id. at 708–10.
48. See id. at 709 (“[T]he Commission noted that its past regulatory treatment of broadband likely had a
particularly small effect on investment because the regulatory status of broadband service was settled for only a
short period of time.”); id. at 710 (“Given this shifting regulatory treatment, it was not unreasonable for the
Commission to conclude that broadband’s particular classification was less important to investors than increased
demand.”).
49. See id. at 746–47 (casting doubt on the FCC’s claims about insufficient reliance and the extent of the
zigzags leading to the 2015 Order, and explaining that “[i]f a regulatory switch will significantly undercut the
productivity and value of past investments, made in reasonable reliance on the old regime, rudimentary fairness
suggests that the agency should take that into account in evaluating a possible switch,” especially because “a
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The panel decision was controversial. A number of judges, including nowJustice Kavanaugh, dissented. Relevant here, Kavanaugh argued that “[t]he
FCC’s net neutrality rule is a major rule for purposes of the Supreme Court’s
major rules doctrine,”50 meaning that it could only stand with “clear
authorization” from Congress, which Kavanaugh concluded was lacking.51
According to Kavanaugh, only Congress, not the FCC, could subject the internet
to common-carrier obligations.
E.

THE 2018 RECLASSIFICATION

In 2018, the FCC again reversed course and “revert[ed] to its pre-2015
position.”52 That reversal was also challenged in the D.C. Circuit and largely
upheld. As to reliance, the panel did not address the Commission’s first
argument—that no one in the industry had, in fact, relied in a “serious” way.53
Instead, the panel focused on the FCC’s arguments that “the 2015 rules had been
in effect ‘barely two years before the Commission proposed to repeal them,’ a
limited period to engender reliance,” and further that “in light of the
Commission’s approach to classifying cable modem service and Internet access
since the late 1990s, the Title II Order could reasonably have been viewed as a
regulatory step that might soon be reversed.”54 In other words, the panel relied
upon analysis very similar to what the panel had used in the 2016 decision.
Judge Millett, however, wrote separately to express her frustration with
Brand X—and in particular, Brand X’s conclusion that “classification of
broadband as an information service was permissible.”55 According to Millett,
echoed by Judge Wilkins,56 the Supreme Court should conclude “that the
‘factual particulars of how Internet technology works,’ have changed so
materially as to undermine the reasonableness of the agency’s judgments.”57 Put
differently, if she could write on a clean slate, it is quite likely that Millett would

pattern of capricious change would undermine any agency purpose of encouraging future investment on the basis
of new rules”) (Williams, J., dissenting in part).
50. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from reh’g
en banc denied); see id. at 402 (Brown, J., dissenting from reh’g en banc denied) (concluding that “turning
Internet access into a public utility is obviously a ‘major question’ of deep economic and political significance”).
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1185
(2018) (“[T]he ‘major questions doctrine’ . . . forbids agencies from interpreting ambiguous statutory language
in a way that ‘would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in [their] regulatory authority
without clear congressional authorization.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
51. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 425 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from reh’g en banc denied) (“The
problem for the FCC is that Congress has not clearly authorized the FCC to classify Internet service as a
telecommunications service and impose common-carrier obligations on Internet service providers. Indeed, not
even the FCC claims that Internet service is clearly a telecommunications service under the statute.”).
52. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
53. Id. at 63–64.
54. Id. at 64.
55. Id. at 87 (Millett, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
56. See id. at 94–95 (Wilkins, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
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hold—in light of how the internet works today—that the FCC has no authority
to classify broadband as an information service.
F.

2020 AND BEYOND?

Will the FCC’s current approach be long for this world? Perhaps not. After
all, there is reason to think that “the FCC in a Democratic administration could
simply bring back the Obama-era regulations, or rules very much like them,
without an act of Congress.”58 Assuming President Trump wins re-election (and
it is always risky to bet against an incumbent), moreover, the White House likely
will flip political hands again at some point while this issue remains salient. So
the zigzagging may not be done yet.
II. A THEORY OF STICKY REGULATIONS
I have offered my theory of sticky regulations before and will not repeat it
in full here. The basic idea is straightforward: To the extent that a legal scheme
can quickly change, rational actors in the private sector are less willing to make
long-term investments in reliance on that scheme, at least at the margins.59
Uncertainty is a problem for regulated parties. But uncertainty can also be a
problem for agencies. If agencies cannot credibly commit that the law won’t
change, they will struggle to achieve policy objectives that depend on long-term
investment from the private sector.60 Flexibility, thus, is not always a blessing
for agencies. Too much of it and policy suffers, especially long-term policy.
So where do we find legal stability? Statutory law—and, a fortiori,
constitutional law—is (relatively) stable precisely because the enactment
process is difficult.61 A statute must pass both houses of Congress and ordinarily
survive a potential presidential veto.62 Given filibuster rules in the Senate and
other competing matters that call for congressional time, achieving that much
policy consensus is difficult even when the same party controls all of Congress
and the White House—which rarely happens. When Congress is divided or the
White House is controlled by one party and Congress by the other, it can even
be more difficult to navigate bicameralism and presentment. Indeed,
operationally, requiring bicameralism and presentment can have the same effect

58. John Hendel, House Democrats’ Net Neutrality Win Likely DOA In Senate but Poised to Become 2020
Issue, POLITICO (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/10/net-neutrality-2020election-issue-1331217.
59. See Nielson, supra note 2, at 90–91.
60. See id.
61. See Nielson, supra note 14, at 1212 (citing John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 GREEN BAG
2D 191, 204 (2007)).
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Of course, it is possible for Congress to override a presidential veto by a
two-thirds majority in each chamber; that process is obviously difficult and rare. Indeed, “[h]istorically,
Congress has overridden fewer than ten percent of all presidential vetoes.” Override of a Veto, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/override_of_a_veto.htm (last visited June 28, 2020).
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as a supermajority voting requirement.63 Amending the Constitution is even
more difficult.64
But what about administrative law? The plain terms of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) do not suggest much stability. Section 553 of the APA, at
least on its face, requires few procedures for informal rulemaking. All an agency
must do is publish a notice of proposed rulemaking with “(1) a statement of the
time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the
legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved.”65 Then, after soliciting comments, the agency is allowed to issue a
final rule, so long as it contains “a concise general statement of [its] basis and
purpose.”66 Nothing in the APA expressly bars an agency from reversing
direction. The closest the APA comes is the requirement that agency action not
be “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,”67 which—as Fox holds
and the FCC’s internet decisions confirm—is not much of a check. At the same
time, agencies receive deference for their reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous law that they implement,68 and, under Brand X, that deference
sometimes allows agencies to override some judicial decisions. As Jonathan
Masur has demonstrated, Brand X also reduces stability because the public
knows that even a prior judicial decision often will not constrain an agency’s
ability to reverse course.69
So is there any stickiness in administrative law? Yes. Despite the APA’s
minimalistic text, courts—perhaps driven by constitutional avoidance70—have
for generations construed the APA to impose procedural requirements on
agencies. For instance, not only must agencies offer “the terms or substance of
the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved,”71 but they
also must turn over any relevant data in order to encourage meaningful
comments.72 Agencies also not only must solicit comments, but they also must
respond to all “material” ones.73 Agencies too must ensure that the final rule is
a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule; if the final rule varies too much from

63. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 703, 712–13 (2002) (citing JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233–
48 (1962); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74–75 (2001)).
64. See generally U.S. CONST. art. V.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018).
66. Id. § 553(c).
67. Id. § 706(2)(A).
68. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
69. See Masur, supra note 10 (arguing this point at length).
70. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293,
1295 (2012) (“Instead of invalidating modern administration on constitutional grounds, the Court has often
addressed the constitutional concerns that modern administrative governance raises through administrative
common law doctrines.”).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3).
72. See Nielson, supra note 2, at 96–97 (citing Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237
(D.C. Cir. 2008)).
73. See id. at 97 (citing City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 714–15 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
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what was submitted for public comment, a reviewing court will invalidate the
rule and make the agency start over.74 Final rules must also withstand “hard
look” review, which can require agencies to spend a great deal of time thinking
through the policy, further creating delay and procedural costs.75 And to top it
all off, in recent decades, the White House—acting through a series of executive
orders—has imposed additional requirements on the rulemaking process, at least
for significant rules.76 All of this naturally makes it more difficult for agencies
to rapidly change direction. Indeed, for that reason, these requirements are often
lamented as “ossifying” rulemaking. Yet that very ossification also creates some
stickiness that agencies can use to encourage greater private-sector reliance on
their rules. Some ossification, thus, expands an agency’s menu of options by
creating a credible commitment mechanism that the regulatory scheme is stable.
III. HOW MUCH STICKINESS?
Moving beyond theory, however, how much stickiness does ossification
create? It surely creates some, but how much? The FCC’s zigzagging treatment
of the internet suggests that the answer may be: not much, particularly for highprofile decisions to which agencies will devote a great many resources. When
the FCC decided to regulate broadband providers as common carriers, it was
able to put together a lengthy rule (114 pages) relatively quickly (approximately
twelve months between issuing a proposed rule and issuing a final rule). And
when the FCC decided to stop regulating broadband providers as common
carriers, it could also do that through a lengthy rule (71 pages) prepared quickly
(approximately seven months). Perhaps other types of regulations are subject to
greater ossification, but at least for regulatory schemes like the FCC’s, it is hard
to say that the regulatory gauntlet creates much stickiness.
Assuming that lack of stickiness is a problem,77 what can be done to create
regulations endowed with greater glue? Here, I sketch out some options. To be
clear, I am not saying that these options are the only ones, or even that they are
worth doing. Nor am I saying that they would not carry with them costs of their
own, including unintended consequences. I am saying, however, that these
options would increase stickiness. Simply put, it is hard to see how we can avoid
zigzagging policy without some changes to the structure of administrative law.
A. CURTAIL BRAND X
One approach is to curtail Brand X. With Brand X, agencies can more
readily change regulatory schemes. Hence, by parity of reason, without Brand
X, a regulated party could more readily rely on an agency regulation, at least if
74. See id. at 97–98 (citing Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN.
L. REV. 213 (1996)).
75. See id. at 98 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983)).
76. See id. at 99–100 (collecting citations).
77. It is not certain that this assumption is true. Stickiness is not always valuable. Indeed, stickiness can be
downright problematic, especially for policies that lack majority support.
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a court had previously interpreted the statute.78 Brand X, moreover, already has
critics.79 It is peculiar that an agency can override a judicial decision about the
meaning of the law.
The problem with this approach to increasing stickiness is that it is hard to
reconcile with Chevron—which may be a problem with Chevron.80 But if
Chevron is right, it is hard to see how Brand X is wrong,81 at least when applied
to rulemaking where concerns about retroactivity are diminished.82 To be sure,
to the extent that Chevron is a fiction,83 perhaps the Supreme Court could revise
the fiction to say that Congress never intended an agency interpretation to
supersede a judicial decision. Or perhaps the Supreme Court could say that if the
Justices themselves have interpreted a statute, an agency could not retreat from
that meaning.84 Brand X itself is odd because it was the Ninth Circuit, not the
Supreme Court, that had previously interpreted the 1996 Telecommunications
Act.85 Neither of these potential revisions to Brand X seems especially consistent
with the internal logic of Chevron. Both, however, would make regulations
stickier.

78. See Masur, supra note 10, at 1024; cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-aHalf, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 800 (2017) (noting that agencies may intentionally downplay the existence of
ambiguity to prompt courts to rule in their favor at Chevron’s first step, and thus, lock in the interpretation).
79. See, e.g., Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from cert. denied)
(urging Supreme Court to overrule Brand X); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Brand X . . . risks trampling the constitutional design by affording executive agencies
license to overrule a judicial declaration of the law’s meaning prospectively, just as legislation might—and all
without the inconvenience of having to engage the legislative processes the Constitution prescribes.”).
80. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“If you accept Chevron’s
claim that legislative ambiguity represents a license to executive agencies to render authoritative judgments
about what a statute means, Brand X’s rule requiring courts to overturn their own contrary judgments does seem
to follow pretty naturally. But acknowledging this much only brings the colossus now fully into view.”).
81. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) (“A
contrary rule would produce anomalous results. It would mean that whether an agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous statute is entitled to Chevron deference would turn on the order in which the interpretations
issue. . . . Yet whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to interpret a statute does not depend
on the order in which the judicial and administrative constructions occur.”).
82. Allowing an agency to use Brand X when it attempts to make policy through adjudication—which is
retroactive—is more problematic for reasons well explained by then-Judge Gorusch. See, e.g., GutierrezBrizuela, 834 F.3d at 1154 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). For what it is worth, Kristin Hickman and I elsewhere
address whether Chevron should apply to interpretations announced in adjudication and whether preventing that
might address Gorsuch’s concern. See Kristin Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2021).
83. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 994, 998
(1992) (describing Chevron as a “fiction”). But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 994 (2013) (suggesting that Congress now legislates against Chevron’s backdrop).
84. Cf. Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 824, 827
(2017).
85. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985 (2005) (“As the
dissent points out, it is not logically necessary for us to reach the question whether the Court of Appeals
misapplied Chevron for us to decide whether the Commission acted lawfully.”).
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B. REVISIT FOX
Another way to inject stickiness into regulations is to require agencies to
place greater emphasis on reliance interests when replacing rules. Although it
certainly contains a nod towards reliance interests,86 the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard in Fox does not
place an especially high premium on stability. The Court explained that, when
an agency changes policy, “it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that
the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one,” and
that it only needs to provide greater explanation when “serious reliance
interests” are implicated.87 Fox therefore demonstrates that agencies have
considerable freedom to reverse course, so long as they explain themselves and
acknowledge the change.88
A problem with this approach to reliance interests is that it is circular.
Regulated parties, as sophisticated actors, will rely on agency regulations to the
extent that the law allows them to rely, but no further. Thus, it is hard to see how
“serious reliance interests” can exist when everyone involved knows the agency
can change its mind. Accordingly, at least absent precedent that already holds
that reliance would be reasonable (as is the case with old policies89 and perhaps
other situations in which reliance is particularly acute90), the idea of reasonable
reliance is puzzling, at least if reviewing courts give the word “reasonable” a
descriptive rather than normative meaning. The D.C. Circuit’s rejection of
reliance in its FCC cases appears to be based on a descriptive understanding of
“reasonable”—namely, despite the FCC’s rulemakings, no one could
reasonably expect a stable scheme.91

86. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (requiring agencies to “provide a
more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate” when revising a
“policy” that “has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account”).
87. See id. at 514 (“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a
requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.”); Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2128 (2016) (“[R]eliance does not overwhelm good reasons for a policy change.”
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
88. See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 2, at 113.
89. See, e.g., Navarro, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (requiring “a more reasoned explanation for [an agency’s]
decision to depart from its existing [and longstanding] enforcement policy.”).
90. See, e.g., Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 F.3d 710, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“Reliance interests pose an especially formidable obstacle to an agency’s desired change in course
in the context of government-issued permitting.”).
91. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[A]ssuming the change in agency position
implicated serious reliance interests, we agree with the Commission that such reliance would have been
unreasonable on the facts before us.”). The fact that agencies also speak with less than perfect clarity, especially
when they try to demonstrate continuity over time, further complicates the search for “reasonable” reliance. See
id. at 65 (“Petitioners’ effort to define the status quo as a whole era of Commission policy . . . renders the claim
more or less non-falsifiable. While outside observers may associate ‘light touch’ with a distinct era in regulation
and ‘open Internet’ with another era, the successive Commission majorities have consistently vowed fealty to
both. . . . Petitioners may distrust the Commission’s stated dedication to an open Internet, but the ubiquity of
Commissioners’ attachment to an open Internet (as well as to ‘light touch’) makes it impossible to rest a reliance
claim on some notion that either phrase represented a discrete policy that has appeared and disappeared with
each zig or zag of Commission analysis.”).
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It is possible to imagine a different version of Fox, one that requires a
significant showing of need before an agency could non-arbitrarily change its
mind. Similarly, one could imagine allowing agencies to issue nonrevocable
rules—though that seems problematic given that sometimes change can be quite
valuable. To be sure, establishing a different version of Fox (one that is less
accommodating to agency efforts to change regulatory policy) may well require
congressional action given the text of the APA and stare decisis.92 But
conceptually, the idea would be that regulated parties should have a real reason
to rely on a regulation merely because it has been promulgated.93 Granted, this
sort of regime may have unintended consequences, especially if administrations
race to regulate so that their favored policies can be locked in. But, for purpose
here, this approach would increase stickiness.94
C. INCREASE OSSIFICATION
Another way to create stickier regulations may be to increase the
procedural requirements for agencies. As I have explained elsewhere, “a
regulatory system that optimizes ossification will, all else being equal, require
more procedures for regulations that benefit from a credible commitment
mechanism or for which the subject is contentious than for other regulations.”95
I’ve also explained elsewhere what some of those extra procedures may entail.
Some types of rules may benefit more from stickiness. And some agencies may
also benefit more from stickiness. For cases in which stickiness is valuable,
Congress could require heightened procedures, such as cross-examination or
judicially enforceable cost-benefit analysis.96
Again, I do not claim that more procedures would be costless. Nor, frankly,
am I confident that more procedures will always produce higher-quality rules
(though they should at least sometimes). But to the extent that procedural costs
make it harder for agencies to change policy, they also create stickiness, at least
at the margins, as agencies have finite resources.
D. REAL STICKINESS
Finally, another answer for zigzagging regulatory schemes may be to
prevent them altogether. The fact that an issue is likely to prompt zigzagging
rulemakings may be a signal that Congress alone should be able to resolve it.
92. See Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 514 (“The [APA] mentions no such heightened standard.”).
93. Cf. Mingo Logan, 829 F.3d at 736 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (explaining that changing position after
an initial decision imposes greater costs on regulated parties, as, for example, “declining to hire someone is
usually less disruptive to the individual than firing someone.”).
94. Related to this option is the possibility of absolute administrative stare decisis, meaning that once an
agency interprets a statute, it is forever binding until Congress intervenes. Gus Hurwitz has explored this idea
with particular focus on separation of powers. See generally Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron’s Political Domain:
W(h)ither Step Three?, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 615 (2019).
95. Nielson, supra note 14, at 1239. The word “ossification” is not ideal, because it suggests too much. I
use the term, however, because it is so common in the literature. See id. at 1210 n.5. And to be clear, delay is
not always good. See id. at 1213.
96. See id. at 1224.
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Then-Judge Kavanaugh and Judge Janice Rogers Brown touched on this
issue when they confronted the Net Neutrality rule and invoked the “major
questions” or “major rules” doctrine. There, they argued that the FCC may have
authority to address small policies, but it lacked authority to promulgate the Net
Neutrality rule.97 In response to this argument, Judge Sri Srinivasan defended
the D.C. Circuit’s decision—but his defense, largely resting on the Supreme
Court’s Brand X decision, did not go to first principles.98
Requiring congressional action for significant policies would enhance legal
stability. Congress can provide greater stability than agencies, precisely because
of Congress’ own onerous procedural obligations. It is not easy to navigate
bicameralism and presentment.
The premise of the “major questions” doctrine is that in “extraordinary
cases,” such as cases with great “economic and political significance,” a
reviewing court should not conclude that Congress authorized the agency to act
absent a clear statement.99 The Court has applied this rule in a number of
cases.100 One significant problem with the “major questions” doctrine, however,
is that the test is difficult to administer.101 It can be challenging to know whether
the agency is “regulating on a ‘major question’ of deep economic and political
significance,” or whether it is “regulating on an interstitial matter.”102 After all,
is the policy “truly an elephant—and not just a rather plump mouse,” and is the
statutory hook “sufficiently unimportant to be a mousehole—and not just a
rather cramped circus tent?”103 Bolstering the major questions doctrine would
require grappling with this difficult question.104
Even so, if the goal is to avoid zigzagging regulations, perhaps courts
should more vigorously enforce the major questions doctrine. One possible
solution, moreover, to the difficult line-drawing problems inherent in the major
questions doctrine is to find a more objective way to distinguish between major
and minor rules. For instance, perhaps agencies should not be allowed to
97. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., dissenting from
reh’g en banc denied) (“The mere fact that a ‘statutory ambiguity’ exists for some purposes does not mean it
authorizes the agency to reach major questions—statutory context and the overall scheme must be considered.”);
id. at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“For an agency to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly authorize
the agency to do so. If a statute only ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule, the rule is unlawful.”).
98. See id. at 385 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in reh’g en banc denied) (“The major question at issue here,
according to our colleague, is whether the FCC can subject broadband ISPs to common carrier obligations. If
we assume that the FCC’s decision to treat broadband ISPs as common carriers amounts to a major rule, the
question then is whether the agency clearly has authority under the Act to make that choice. In Brand X, the
Supreme Court definitively—and authoritatively, for our purposes as an inferior court—answered that question
yes.” (citation omitted)).
99. See, e.g., FDA. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (rejecting the
argument that Congress “intended to delegate a decision of such . . . significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion”).
100. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 403 (collecting citations).
101. See, e.g., Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN L. REV. 19,
45-46, 52 (2010).
102. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 403.
103. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 101, at 45.
104. See id. at 45–46.
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promulgate regulations with an economic significance greater than $X, with $X
decided by Congress.105 Similarly, perhaps when zigzagging regulations
emerge, a reviewing court should be able to more readily conclude that the
question is major. Candidly, that sort of line may also create perverse incentives,
but it perhaps could create greater long-term stability too.106
CONCLUSION
Our nation’s oscillating approach to internet regulation is important in its
own right. The lesson it offers for administrative law, however, is not limited to
the internet. The reality is that in a polarized society, it is difficult for the White
House to convince Congress to enact legislation. Presidents of both parties thus
have increasingly turned to the administrative state, rather than Congress, for
their policy goals. But policy made through the administrative process can be
unmade through the administrative process, and to the extent that policies made
through the administrative process lack bipartisan support, we should expect
incoming administrations to undo what their predecessors have done.
Zigzagging policy, however, is not costless, especially for policies that
require long-term investment. So the question is: what to do about it? One
answer may be nothing—the costs of foregone flexibility may not justify the
benefits of enhanced stability. If we decide to do something, however, the ideas
here should help. Other ideas too may also merit consideration. But absent
structural reform, there may not be a lot of stickiness in administrative law, at
least for certain types of policies.

105. This dividing line may not be perfect either. Agencies also may try to evade dollar limits when they
structure their rules. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1755, 1792 (2013).
106. Others have argued that independent agencies should receive less deference for policies than what other
agencies receive. See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron
Deference, and Fox, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (2010) (“[S]uggest[ing] . . . ‘a reading of Chevron that
accords less deference to independent agencies’ decisions than to those of executive branch agencies would be
more consistent with our constitutional system and its values.’”) (quoting Randolph J. May, Defining Deference
Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 453 (2006)). The FCC, of course,
is an independent agency. That said, zigzagging policy need not be limited to independent agencies. See, e.g.,
Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]hese days it sometimes seems agencies change their statutory
interpretations almost as often as elections change administrations.”).
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